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Chapter 2. Underground and underwater: gatekeeping oil exploration during the Cold 
War
Roberto Cantoni and Leucha Veneer
Abstract: In the first half of the Cold War several administrations in Western Europe sought 
to increase the amount of oil and gas that could be made available to their countries. These 
arrangements aimed to boost their national economies but they were also vital to energy 
security and molded the management of new discoveries and supplies of hydrocarbons at 
home and abroad. This paper focuses in particular on the plans outlined by the governments 
of two former imperial powers, France and Britain; their relationships with the superpowers; 
and those with neighboring partners and rivals. It shows how these administrations used 
different strategies of surveillance and diplomacy to gain and retain control of, and access to, 
strategically vital oil-rich areas, especially those in Algeria and in the North Sea. We 
conclude that geological exploration, and in particular oil prospecting, became another tool 
for nations long accustomed to intelligence gathering and surveying in the imperial context, 
to cater for their national energy security. 
In the years following World War Two, global demand for oil increased continually, and 
Western European governments pursued various political and diplomatic strategies to obtain 
hydrocarbons as further reserves were revealed across the world. The tensions of the Cold 
War increased national concerns over energy security yet further, and in this essay we shall 
discuss some aspects of the particular strategies employed by two leading Western European 
administrations, to gain at least some control over the sources of their supply. These strategies 
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included maneuvers such as stockpiling, encouraging diversification of supply, and, when the 
opportunity arose, controlling access to resources on home soil and abroad. This control 
required the mobilization of state and commercial geological surveying to obtain 
“geostrategic intelligence”, that is to say gathering information on what oil and gas reserves 
could be found underground; finding out what others (whether enemies or allies, co-
producers or business rivals) already knew about these reserves; and what acquisition 
strategies they had put in place. Surveillance in terms of both geophysical exploration and 
intelligence gathering was therefore an essential element of oil security; an element often 
neglected in the existing literature on the history of oil exploration.1 Oil surveillance 
operations also produced conflicts between diplomats, firm managers, government officials 
and geoscientists of different countries. As Robert Jervis more generally shows, the bolstering 
of energy security through surveillance activities by one administration made its neighbors 
feel less reassured about their own security.2
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The Cold War may have, broadly speaking, divided the world in two, but within that 
division was a somewhat fragmented system of alliances. Using archival material, this paper 
focuses in particular on the traditional imperial powers of France and Britain because the 
international postwar order had forced both states into positions of lesser powers than before, 
their commercial and diplomatic footprints becoming accordingly smaller. Therefore their oil 
security circumstances appear unique.3 Moreover, both nations, due to that imperial past, 
were accustomed to maintaining significant numbers of scientific and intelligence personnel 
abroad, especially in colonies and countries that had recently gained independence. Here we 
reveal that these energy security urgencies prompted French geo-scientific personnel to start 
exploring Algeria at the end of World War Two. In Britain at a slightly later date, following 
the embarrassment of the Abadan and Suez Crises,4 the discovery of gas in the North Sea 
started a rush for oil there as Britain sought self-sufficiency in fulfilling its energy needs.
The Secret Struggle for Algerian Oil
When World War Two ended the French government was not the only Western European 
administration concerned about how to source oil to fuel the nation. However, its officials 
were more alert to the plans of other countries asserting a presence in the world’s oil-rich 
regions. Cold War divides notwithstanding, the plans of their allies worried French 
government officials more than the distant Russian bear, especially as British and US oil 
firms held a dominant position in the French metropolitan oil market. The French oil industry 
was the largest in Europe before the conflict, but after 1945 it had to completely rebuild. 
Furthermore, its main source of supply in the Middle East was lost; an element that forced the 
French to be more vigilant both in terms of finding new deposits and controlling what other 
countries were doing.5
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France’s largest oil company, the Compagnie française des pétroles (CFP), had 
maintained a presence in the Middle East, and owned shares in the Iraq Petroleum Company 
(IPC), a consortium that also included the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell, the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (controlled by the British Government), and five American companies. But at 
the end of the conflict British and US oil majors challenged the so-called Red Line 
Agreement that ensured equal IPC shares within the territories of the former Ottoman Empire 
(see figure 2.1). The dispute revealed to French government officials that the US 
administration had allowed American oil companies to challenge the status quo in the
[Figure 2.1 approximately here!]
 extraction and distribution of oil supplies from the Middle East. The war had quite evidently 
established new balances of power in the region. Moreover, the US companies Standard Oil 
of New Jersey and Standard Oil of New York now wanted to take a larger share of Saudi oil; 
in order to do so, they had to rid themselves of the constraints of the Red Line. Anglo-Iranian 
and Shell were willing to appease the Americans and did nothing to stop the Arabian-
American Oil Company (ARAMCO), which was not originally part of the IPC and held 
concessions in Saudi Arabia, from “crossing” the Red Line. So in the spring of 1946, Jersey 
Standard publicly declared that they considered the agreement to have lapsed, owing to 
France’s wartime status as an enemy power during the period of the Vichy regime.6 During an 
autumn visit to Europe, representatives of the American oil majors further bolstered the US 
position by maintaining that the Sherman Antitrust Act forbade them to respect the restrictive 
provisions of the agreement, which would amount to cartelization.7 
The secret deals between Americans and British convinced the French that they ought 
to reinforce their information-gathering activities on foreign oil agreements. At a CFP board 
meeting in December 1946, Director René de Montaigu confirmed press rumors that Jersey 
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and New York Standards had acquired shares in ARAMCO, while President Victor de Metz 
informed the board of a new agreement between Anglo-Iranian and the two Standards.8 The 
deal reassured British and US governments about controlling oil provisions in the Middle 
East at the expense of French energy security. During the next twenty years the British 
government-controlled AIOC sold Jersey 160 million tons (Mt) of crude, and the two 
companies jointly built a pipeline linking the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. 9 The British 
used it for their Kuwaiti crude, which they exploited on a fifty-fifty basis with Gulf (another 
US firm). Shell’s neutrality was also acquired through a very favorable contract allowing the 
company free access to Kuwaiti oil: from May 1947, Gulf provided 30 percent of Shell’s 
crude oil requirements in the Eastern Hemisphere.10 
Naturally, the CFP managers understood that American and British governments had 
done nothing to prevent this situation (in fact they had encouraged it),  but it was especially 
the extension of British and US oil interests in Northern Africa that the French could not 
stomach. With the Treaty of Paris of 1947, Libya ceased to be an Italian colony: two of its 
three regions, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, passed under British military control while the 
third, Fezzan, was controlled by the French. According to journalist Pierre Fontaine, a “secret 
battle” now ensued between British and French administrations to draw the borders between 
Cyrenaica and the potentially oil-rich Fezzan region. An army of scientific experts was 
mobilized to find out how much oil could be sourced out from this region and what the 
British were after. Thanks to pioneering prospecting activities carried out by geologist 
Conrad Kilian in the 1920s and 1930s, French oil authorities were in fact fully aware of the 
region’s potential.11 In 1942 Kilian had even been approached by ARAMCO and Shell 
consultants, who lured him into revealing them his Saharan secrets, but he had rejected their 
offers.12
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Kilian now considered it imperative that the CFP establish a partnership with US oil 
concerns in prospecting work. In 1947 the French geologist met Jean Bédier, director of the 
powerful Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and showed him his findings. With the help of the 
former director of the Office National des combustibles liquides, Bédier thus submitted a 
project calling for the establishment of a French-American consortium for the exploration and 
exploitation of Fezzan. French officials now understood that establishing a consortium would 
mollify American diplomacy in the dispute with the British for the definition of Libya’s 
internal borders and encouraged the deal.13 However at the last minute Kilian withdraw his 
support and the secrets of Fezzan’s underground would remain hidden for some time. 
Kilian had also urged the French government to prospect Algeria for hydrocarbons. 
His observations on the sediments of the Hoggar area, in the Sahara, suggested the existence 
of geological conditions apt to the presence of oil. In November 1948 his report was passed 
on to the French Académie des Sciences, sealed in a box, and stayed untouched until the 
geologist’s death three years later.14 Kilian’s hypotheses on the area turned out to be only 
partially accurate, but his work paved the way to the exploration of the Sahara desert, and 
instigated the CFP to prospect more.15 The dispute between British and French governments 
on Fezzan continued and, by the end of the 1940s, it was informed by other factors. The 
Soviets sought to support Arab nationalism in the region, partly in an effort to gain control of 
oil resources. US and British oil companies now stealthily mobilized their own scientific 
monitoring networks to search for new oilfields out of Soviet and French reach. To this effect 
the British even employed a geologist turned diplomat and military intelligence agent: 
Francis James Rennell Rodd. A specialist in the study of oil-bearing structures of the Fezzan 
region and a collaborator to the International Geological Map of Africa, Rodd exploited his 
knowledge of local territories and local elites in an attempt to gain control of its yet untapped 
oil deposits.16
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Meanwhile, the information that the French had secretly acquired on the dealings of 
the Standards and ARAMCO in the Middle East was passed on to their government’s legal 
departments with a view to launching proceedings in international courts. In 1946 de Metz 
urged that CFP’s board take legal action at the British High Court of Justice against the 
American consortium’s decision to terminate the Red Line Agreement.17 Two governmental 
commissars, the Fuel Director and President of the Bureau de recherches de pétrole (BRP), 
Pierre Guillaumat, and the President of the Bank of Algeria, Jacques Brunet, supported de 
Metz’s proposition. It is important to note that during World War Two Guillaumat had worked 
together with the French intelligence in Tunisia and Algeria. Like Rodd, he had gathered 
information on foreign territories, their resources and secretly managed details on oil 
deposits. He would play a decisive role in reorganizing the oil prospecting sector using this 
knowledge. Having to face the Anglo-American dealings in the Middle East excluding 
France, Guillaumat retaliated by seeking to reduce the influence of British and American oil 
interests in the French metropole. He also instructed the French Ambassador in Washington to 
deliver a letter of formal protest against the US denunciation of the Red Line agreement. 18
On the eve of the first court hearing on this agreement in London, a Shell 
representative, John Boyle, proposed a compromise to de Metz and de Montaigu. The IPC 
would supply CFP as its managers wished, and a new pipeline would be built from Kirkuk to 
the Mediterranean Sea. The counterproposal was accepted but de Metz only agreed to 
postpone legal proceedings. The following February the French filed the court petition again 
hoping now to force the Americans to re-open negotiations.19 In March the French 
Ambassador received a reply from George Marshall, the US Acting Secretary of State, so the 
legal challenge at least helped the French to force the Americans to compromise. By the end 
of May 1947 a settlement was reached. The CFP would withdraw its objections in exchange 
for an increase in its share of IPC production which would also be increased considerably its 
7
Cantoni and Veneer, Oil Security
output to accommodate French oil demand.20 The Heads of Agreement were signed by all the 
major IPC partners a year later.21 British and Americans diplomats thus realized that the 
French government was prepared to make use of its experts, intelligence agents and lawyers 
in defense of oil security, or in order to force them to renegotiate existing agreements to 
increase French oil supplies in the wake of the Cold War. However, more security concerns 
soon arose in Paris and soon forced the French to reconsider their position in the Middle East 
consortium with a plan to invest more in North African resources.
The scramble for oil in North Africa
The new IPC deal appeared to be short-lived. The superpowers’ influence in the Middle East 
increased quickly and dramatically, making diplomatic and oil relations more volatile. In 
1946 the Soviet government had urged Iran to start up an oil exploration company, though the 
Iranians had later cancelled the deal and struck a military agreement with the US government. 
The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 led to the permanent closure of one of IPC’s terminals. And 
both Iraqi and Iranian officials sought to obtain fifty-fifty contracts from the oil majors 
modeled on the one conceded by ARAMCO to Saudi Arabia. The new arrangements would 
make the two contracting parties equal partners, thus ending the exploiter-exploited relation 
characterizing previous contracts. The majors’ refusal to agree on this request produced 
tensions and contributed to destabilize the area. The French government now decided to 
partly disengage from the Middle East. The decision was taken as a consequence of the re-
organization of the oil administration at government level, and also because of the presence 
of Anglo-American interests within CFP; only 35 percent of its shares now belonged to the 
French state.
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The French Provisional Government led by Charles de Gaulle instigated the 
foundation of new public agencies responsible for exploring for oil in the French Union, as 
well as for the technical development of French know-how in oil exploration. It then urged 
these agencies to shift exploration from the Middle East to Africa, especially the Sahara 
desert and the Guinea Gulf. Threatening French oil security in the Middle East thus 
stimulated sweeping surveys in the French colonies. The creation of the oil exploration 
agency BRP, and the presence of former intelligence agent Guillaumat at its helm,  marked the 
beginning of a new era in the history of French oil. BRP managers came from similar 
educational backgrounds as most of them had been trained at the Parisian military academy 
École Polytechnique and at the Corps des Mines, institutes that offered the most prestigious 
technical and engineering training in France. Soon a small group of experts, characterized by 
strong personal and political links took control of the French oil agencies. Many corpsards – 
like Guillaumat – had entered the cadres of the French intelligence services during the war, 
and now engaged in bringing together intelligence and geological expertise. Guillaumat had 
also kept many informants in North Africa. André Rauscher, a Shell engineer in Tunisia and a 
fellow polytechnicien, had helped Guillaumat by spying on the Italian army’s prospecting 
activities in Libya. Pierre Taranger of the Compagnie Générale de géophysique (CGG), and 
Léon Kaplan of Shell were also close to Guillaumat and directly involved in French oil 
exploration.22
The French began to explore North Africa by using all techniques made available by 
CGG, especially through a grand gravimetry reconnaissance campaign in 1948, and through 
seismology from 1951. However, gravimetry was slow and its interpretation in the region 
proved hard; reflection seismology produced deceptive results, while photo-geology could 
not be applied outside the Saharan Atlas Mountains, where the mass of Mesozoic layers 
hindered surface geology. Because of these problems, the chief geologist of BRP’s Algerian 
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affiliate SN REPAL, Igor Ortynski, suggested that CGG apply seismic refraction; a method 
that had been out of fashion for decades, but which seemed to be more suitable to the 
geological characteristics of the Sahara desert.23 From 1952 CGG started a new campaign that 
produced more successful results. Besides eliminating the problem of multiple reflections, 
refraction seismology allowed penetrating younger geological layers and forming a picture of 
deeper layers.24
The accumulation of this knowledge on local underground resources helped the 
French to focus on specific areas to explore. Those in the French Union – as the area formerly 
included in the French Empire was called from 1946 – could now be used without previous 
negotiations or the establishment of new consortia.25 The Union was French territory and 
could therefore be treated as private ground. In the Algerian Sahara the BRP sponsored novel 
explorations through SN REPAL and with the collaboration of CFP. French experts thus 
gained a refined understanding of the geology of the Saharan region, which would soon prove 
of capital importance in the oil discoveries that took place between 1952 and 1954. 
US and British oil concerns also developed an interest in Algerian oil and tried to get 
their shares of territory to explore. Guillaumat soon realized that Kilian’s early findings and 
recently acquired geophysical knowledge should not be divulged, but this was not enough to 
grant safe and quick oil supplies from Algeria. The French needed to prospect more if they 
wanted energy autonomy within a few years. They were therefore faced with two main 
options: let the Anglo-American enterprises into the Sahara, and gain in efficiency, financial 
backing and technological knowledge; or continue their path independently at the risk of 
having to carry a colossal prospecting burden over many years. This second choice would be 
a dangerous scheme for a country heavily struggling with inflation. In June 1947, the French 
Director of General Affairs, Pierre Maisonneuve, organized a conference at the Under-
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Directorate of Algeria to discuss the prospecting plans of three foreign companies (Caltex, 
Gulf and AIOC) that had shown an interest in Algeria.26 Several ministries and oil company 
representatives (including that of SN REPAL) attended. Guillaumat argued that collaboration 
with foreign companies would be extremely profitable to the French economy, due to the 
shaky state of French finances.27 But his proposal to develop joint participations with these 
companies encountered resistance. The representative of the Algerian Government General, 
Henri Urbani, challenged Guillaumat’s favorable attitude towards foreign companies, 
expressing his serious concern over a too permissive stance.28 What worried Urbani was 
especially lack of knowledge of what US crews were doing in Algeria and how much they 
knew about French operations: 
First of all, every day we see Americans coming back and forth to Algeria. We don’t 
know much about what they come to do, but what we do know is that they are 
interested in oil. […] Once we will have given the Americans exploration permits, we 
will see them arriving in Algeria en masse and, from that moment on, what will their 
action be in the country?29
Urbani’s reservations were understandable: in June 1947 France was still very weak, 
both financially and politically, whereas the role of the US as a superpower had been made 
clear by the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine only three months earlier.  There was little 
doubt that France would be forced to give in if the Americans decided to deploy all their 
influence in North Africa: even more so if they opted for a major prospecting effort; 
something that the French could not match. Urbani’s point was thus that the French ought not 
to make concessions in order to have the upper hand in the region. Guillaumat, however, 
disagreed. He believed that few American companies could work outside the US with the 
same proficiency they had at home. Furthermore, he was not at all convinced that such frantic 
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foreign activity had taken place from 1942 to 1945 in Algeria. As a former intelligence 
officer, and thanks to his relations with people such as Taranger, Guillaumat had access to 
restricted information that Urbani simply lacked.30 Lucien Bonneau, Plenipotentiary Minister 
and Director of Africa and Near East at the Foreign Ministry, also downplayed the extent of 
American influence in North Africa but showed wariness. If the Americans were determined 
to access North Africa, they would use their powerful transport or radio companies – and, 
undoubtedly, their secret services. 
The notable difference of viewpoints between Urbani and Guillaumat was also 
discussed at SN REPAL’s board meetings, where it was concluded that foreign assistance was 
needed only in the supply of materials and specialized drilling staff. SN REPAL took the lead 
in general operations, and only collaborated with foreign enterprises in associations where it 
held a majority of shares.31 Guillaumat succeeded in convincing his colleagues that 
collaboration in Algeria would not threaten French interests in the region. Was he really 
aware of what the British and Americans were really doing? While the French had been 
reconnoitering the Algerian underground, the Americans had been busy reconnoitering it 
from the sky.
British and American attempts to enter Algeria
The surveillance of potential oil-bearing areas in Algeria was a decisive element in 
establishing whether or not the oil majors would try to enter Algeria and whether the French 
could stop them. Guillaumat knew that during World War Two the US Air Force had taken 
aerial photographs in Algeria and that the photos contained details of geological structures 
that revealed the presence of oil deposits. After the war, the French government had agreed 
with US diplomats that photographic material ought not to be shared without prior French 
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consent. On the other hand the French did not hold copies of these photographs either.32 In 
1947 French officials authorized Jersey Standard experts to see the photographs and the 
following year an agreement signed at the French Embassy in Washington enabled the French 
Air Force’s Chiefs of Staff to obtain copies of the photos. It is likely that SN REPAL obtained 
access to these copies as well.33 
Caltex, Gulf, Anglo-Iranian and Shell had been attracted by the French exploratory 
activities in Algerian territories. Should oil be found, these companies were ready to wield the 
power they enjoyed as a result of the war in major exploratory campaigns. Yet, as they did not 
have access to the photos, they could not know enough about the real Algerian potential. So 
before setting foot in Algeria, they used their lawyers to sound out French reactions, and to 
determine from these reactions if the French had found oil deposits. In September 1947, one 
of Gulf’s lawyers sent a letter to Yves Chataigneau, Governor General of Algeria, through the 
French Embassy in Washington.34 After that, Gulf received useful data on Algerian geology 
through the French Embassy and decided to begin large-scale works, provided the French 
government agreed. Gulf representatives now approached the officials of the Direction des 
carburants and BRP in Paris, and met Guillaumat and BRP’s Delegate-General, Paul Moch. 
Gulf was ready to carry out prospecting works for over $1 million, including surface 
geological and seismic works, and photogeology.35 We have seen that while Guillaumat saw 
favorably the collaboration with foreign interests, he wanted to retain absolute control of 
geological data. But Gulf demanded instead a series of guarantees, including the availability 
to Gulf of documentation kept by the Mine Service, SN REPAL, the Hydrography Service, as 
far as geology and oil exploration was concerned. Thus a conflict between different 
departments in the French government ensued and when Gulf applied for an exploration 
license, it was refused.36 
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The same strenuous opposition, however, did not characterize SN REPAL’s board, 
which welcomed a collaborative project with an affiliate of the US oil firm Jersey. In 1947 
Jersey had shown some interest for searching oil in Algeria and had obtained authorization to 
send a team of geologists and carry out a study on the oil potential of the Saharan region, 
provided an account of the team’s activities was transmitted to SN REPAL. Jersey could even 
use the set of aerial photographs taken during the war by the US Air Force for its exploration.
But the collaboration was short-lived. When the Americans realized (perhaps mistakenly) that 
the only area deemed to have serious commercial oil possibilities was one that would be 
assigned to SN REPAL, they pulled out.37
One reason for Guillaumat to encourage collaboration with foreign enterprises in 
Algeria was that he hoped to gain some influence in oil exploration projects in other areas of 
the world. In October 1951 Shell, through its affiliate Shell Française, informed the new 
Governor General of Algeria, Roger Léonard, of its intention to ask for a vast exploration 
permit. Guillaumat reckoned that room for Shell could be found in the Sahara if they 
accepted French participation in their exploration activities in Canada and Venezuela. 
Representatives of the Ministry of Finances and Economic Affairs stressed the difficulties of 
this solution but eventually the French administration allowed participation in Shell’s works, 
together with a small contribution from BRP.38 
That Guillaumat and his collaborators were willing to facilitate relations with foreign 
companies did not mean all the oil executives in French companies embraced his viewpoint, 
especially when yielding to those companies could jeopardize their primacy in the area. An 
episode regarding Shell and SN REPAL clearly shows this point. In February 1952 the 
President of SN REPAL, Roger Goetze, forwarded to Moch (the BRP Delegate General) two 
letters to urge him to consider the consequences of allocating foreign companies permits in 
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areas bordering those requested by CFP-SN REPAL (see figure 2.2). Goetze stressed the 
existence of a clause contained in SN REPAL’s permit allowing the company to prospect
[Figure 2.2 approximately here!]
outside its permit zone. The French had requested their permits in August 1950, earlier than 
Shell, but these had not yet been awarded. Furthermore, since geological knowledge about 
the area was less detailed at the time that SN REPAL had requested its permits, Shell could 
now ask licenses for more promising areas. Goetze pointed out that in the light of the new 
geological data about the Saharan basin it would be preferable to allow SN REPAL priority 
over Shell or other companies on unexplored areas. In order to prevent Shell from gaining 
uncontrolled access to the desired area, Goetze even proposed that SN REPAL take a 
financial stake in all companies engaged in the Sahara, especially in prospecting activities, so 
as not to miss any opportunity that might accrue.39 Eventually, although the requests jointly 
made by Shell and by the Régie autonome des pétroles (RAP, a French public oil agency) 
were approved, SN REPAL received the Governor’s support to obtain a counselor seat with 
no financial stake, or a small stake (up to 5 per cent) in the companies to be formed by Shell 
and RAP.40 
The results of collaborative prospecting activities would eventually prove 
Guillaumatʼs strategy right, as they enabled the first major oil discoveries in Algeria. Up until 
the outbreak of the Algerian war in 1954, the Algerian Sahara remained firmly in French 
hands and provided France with the supply of oil it badly needed to cope with national 
demands. In 1953, the re-opening of Anglo-French negotiations on joint collaborative work 
led to the constitution of two companies, the Compagnie de recherche et d’exploitation de 
pétrole au Sahara (65 per cent RAP; 35 per cent Shell), and the Compagnie des pétroles 
d’Algérie (65 per cent Shell; 35 per cent RAP).41 In 1954 the first of these companies 
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discovered the first gas field of commercial value in the area, and two years later also 
discovered the Edjeleh oilfield. 
Thanks to the geophysical knowledge put compiled during the past ten years, the 
French administration could thus address its energy security needs. SN REPAL and BRP 
discovered in 1956 the two largest Algerian oil and gas fields, Hassi Messaoud and Hassi 
R’Mel, and kept control of them. Since the main American concern regarding the conflict was 
to keep the Soviets out of North Africa, the early Cold War tensions on oil supplies between 
American and British oil companies and the France administration relaxed somewhat. 
However, this situation was complicated by events in the late 1950s, principally the conflict 
for Algerian independence. While this paper does not discuss the impact of this conflict on 
French energy security in detail, it is worth mentioning that it partly upset the system of 
selective collaborations with foreign concerns that Guillaumat had put in place. In particular, 
both Italian and US firms now used the conflict as a lever to gain more influence in the 
exploitation of Algerian hydrocarbons. Meanwhile the French and the British joined forces in 
the Suez Canal crisis, thus overcoming their traditional enmity in oil affairs. This leads us to 
consider another case, that of the North Sea, where the gathering of knowledge on oil and gas 
fields was decisive in shaping relations between another former imperial power, Britain, and 
its neighboring countries. 
The Race for the North Sea
The British case presents various points of contrast and comparison with the French, 
especially following the discovery of gas in the North Sea in 1959 (with the concomitant 
realization of the long-held expectation that there would also be oil). Up until then the British 
had not only – as we have seen – been active in North Africa and the Middle East, but had 
also been attempting to mobilize their allies to counter threats to oil security as much as 
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possible. In particular, the oil disputes in the Middle East and North Africa between key Cold 
War allies highlighted to the British government the urgency of reaching agreements on oil 
security through supra-national organizations emanating from Cold War divisions. For 
instance, from the early 1950s Britain encouraged the defense alliance it belonged to, NATO, 
to take oil stockpiling seriously for both military and energy security purposes and mustered 
support for a Petroleum Planning Committee to look at the supply lines and storage of 
military and civilian oil across the alliance. The Committee was even made responsible for 
developing strategies to protect these supplies in the event of World War Three. 
Another element producing anxiety in the British government was the diplomatic 
victory of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Suez Crisis. This was bad for 
British oil security, but even worse for the French colonial interests, as, so the French 
claimed, Nasser was acting as a proxy between the Soviets and the Algerians, and was the 
main channel through which the North Africans received weapons supplies. The outcome of 
the Suez expedition strengthened the Algerian liberation movement, and made Nasser the 
champion of Arab nationalism. This outcome warned British policy-makers about existing 
threats to oil security and this continued to be a key issue in the administration of 
governmental affairs. Britain could now found itself isolated in its quest to secure more oil. 
Similarly to the French administrators at the BRP, their British colleagues at the Ministry of 
Power understood that the solution to the oil supply problem rested with the ability to know 
more about oil deposits underground. But in contrast with the French, the British found that 
the solution to their problems was much closer to home and required no intervention in 
colonies or former colonies.  
So although underlying security concerns in Britain were similar to those of the 
French, the diplomatic and scientific pressures were different, and so were the strategies and 
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fuel policies that the Ministry of Power adopted in response, the most important aspect of 
which, with regard to the North Sea, was to put together the essential information regarding 
gas fields so as to quickly establish control on its output through licensing. This was even 
more of an imperative as Britain had no state oil company, and was therefore reliant on 
commercial enterprise. The British government held a controlling stake in AIOC, but the 
company had been greatly changed by the Iranian government’s decision to nationalize the 
Iranian oil industry in 1951, which had led to the Abadan Crisis. AIOC became the British 
Petroleum Company (BP) in 1954.42 Before the discovery of gas in the North Sea, the British 
Government encouraged companies such as BP, Shell and Esso to stockpile crude oil and 
diversify their sources of supply as much as possible.43 Nationalization never became part of 
the Ministry’s strategy. The UK gas industry had been nationalized in 1948, but no state oil 
company was founded in Britain, even in the wake of the North Sea discoveries, for fear it 
would damage existing relations with the oil companies.44 Nor were these arguments ever 
simply about business methods and oil revenues: in the international Cold War context, there 
was the ever-looming possibility that Soviet military action might affect both civilian and 
military oil supplies from the Middle East, and the great risk inherent in British dependence 
on imported oil became starkly clear as domestic demand continued to rise. 
In the early 1960s, therefore, the British Government felt the potential threat to its 
supplies was serious, and quickly put into action a policy that not merely encouraged but 
actively forced rapid exploitation of North Sea oil through commercial and scientific 
avenues. Although oil and gas had been found just before WW2, from 1959 the location of 
the Slochteren gas field in the Groningen province produced a rush towards prospecting and 
finding more hydrocarbons.45
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The UK Parliament soon passed a bill claiming sovereignty over all submarine 
resources on its continental shelf and in 1962 British Petroleum (BP) established the first 
offshore prospecting site in Weymouth Bay. However, BP experts knew that sites in British 
waters had limited prospect, whereas the North Sea basin which geologically resembled 
northern Netherlands had much more promise.46 Once the surveys (geological sampling, 
gravity and seismic) revealed that the richest field where placed in the Norwegian shelf, the 
British government sought to prevent other European countries from staking a claim on these 
fields by quickly reaching an agreement with Norway and licensing exploitation soon 
afterwards (see figure 2.3).
[Figure 2.3. approximately here] 
The agreement, signed in 1964, was far more advantageous to the Norwegians than 
they had expected, but would enable oil companies supplying Britain to gain permits to pump 
gas out quickly and virtually unchallenged, offering “oil security” for the foreseeable future. 
The agreement with Norway over the division of all waters too far north for continental 
European countries to claim them was rapidly reached.47 So if French thirst for oil had led to 
attempted territorial expansion and control, then Britain now agreed to a slight reduction in 
territory in order to begin extraction at once. Exploration licenses were issued already in 
1964, though a final agreement on the division of the North Sea was not concluded until 
1972. By 1967, when the Minister of Power Richard Marsh reported to the House of 
Commons about fuel policy, 54 exploration wells had been drilled in the North Sea by at least 
15 different companies.48
The deal with Norway, however, now compelled British authorities to constantly 
monitor the prospecting efforts of other countries and firms in the North Sea. The UK and 
Norway were, naturally, not the only countries hurrying to exploit resources on their 
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continental shelves, and diplomatic negotiations over which companies from which countries 
had access to which nations’ submarine resources became complicated and required a certain 
delicacy, For instance, although by the 1960s French and British administration had restored 
amicable relations on oil matters, the French still with the British in the North Sea and 
keeping tabs on neighbors’ oil supply was still essential to acquisition strategies. But what 
really worried the Ministry of Power officials was Germany. In 1963 BP was excluded from a 
consortium that was to operate in the German North Sea and learnt that the French BRP was 
given licenses instead by West Germany. The following year, BP thus requested that the 
Ministry of Power arrange a diplomatic approach to the government of the Federal German 
Republic to enable BP’s German subsidiary to gain access to the German North Sea. BP was 
excluded from a consortium that was to operate in this area because, the company was told, 
their interest had not been expressed soon enough. BP officials were reluctantly prepared to 
accept the decision. Yet they eventually learnt that the French BRP was admitted after BP was 
refused, and that BRP had expressed interest later BP had. Ministry of Power officials thus 
suggested to the Foreign Office that if BP was discriminated against, there might be 
reciprocity when it came to the issuing of licenses for British areas of the North Sea. In the 
end, BP became resigned to the situation when the Germans promised that the consortium 
would operate only in the German North Sea, and whole areas of German continental shelf in 
the Baltic remained open for other companies, BP included.49 
The attitudes of both Ministry of Power officials and the companies themselves could 
change very quickly, though; especially when restricted information on other countries’ 
intentions was made available. In 1966 another area of continental shelf, this time the 
Swedish Baltic, came under negotiation, and the Ministry of Power learnt from Foreign 
Office officials that believed the Swedish government was forming a consortium of Swedish 
companies to explore its own waters. Though the Swedes would have to buy in equipment 
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and expertise, the British government – and BP – thought that the formation of the 
consortium indicated the probability the probability that foreign companies would not be 
permitted direct access.50 What worried them even more was that the Soviets might be luring 
the Swede somehow and be given access instead. Though the earlier case had not, in the end, 
resulted in either French or German companies being treated differently by the Minister of 
Power when he allocated licenses for the North Sea, the question was raised again for the 
Swedish case. Since British companies had not an urgent need to gain access to the Swedish 
continental shelf, British diplomats eventually agreed that there was no reason to openly 
challenge the decision. It seemed better to “adopt a liberal attitude ourselves and then take 
what credit we can for it rather than threaten reciprocal restrictions,” as one Ministry official 
put it.51 Furthermore, there was another potential security issue with the Swedish Baltic Sea: 
if an open invitation to Western companies to prospect was demanded by Western 
governments, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that the USSR would begin to take an 
interest as well, and Russian pressure on Sweden was not something the West would 
welcome.
Not indifferently from the Algerian case, the accumulation and circulation of new 
geophysical knowledge on potential oil deposits played a key role in disputes on the North 
Sea licenses. The first license for British North Sea oil explorations had been issued by the 
Minister of Power in 1964/65 and expired in 1970. By 1967, therefore, some companies had 
been gathering more accurate geological data for two years, and all of them would continue 
to do so for another three. In contrast Ministry officials now realized that they would not be 
able to make sound evaluations on the reissuing of those licenses in the next round unless 
they possessed the same information.52 And since the urgency to explore the North Sea as 
quickly as possible remained, those licenses would have to be immediately re-issued. 
Although the British government did not have an equivalent of the BRP, like the French 
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organization it compelled the companies that had licenses to share their raw data with, in this 
case the Ministry of Power, so that information could be made readily available to its officials 
and ensured them overall control over licensing. Now, however, the lack of scientific 
expertise amongst Ministry of Power to process the raw data created anxiety since the 
licensed oil firms would share the data but not their scientific interpretations. The Ministry of 
Power therefore turned to the newly established Institute of Geological Sciences (IGS, 
formerly the British Geological Survey) and its new director, Kingsley Charles Dunham.  53
Although recently appointed, Dunham did not lack familiarity with the wider 
situation. He had a breadth of academic and commercial experience and was Professor of 
Geology at the University of Durham from 1950. He was familiar the mining sector 
internationally having been a consultant for several firms. Amongst these featured 
investigations for Iraq Petroleum in Oman and South Yemen and the reconnaissance of black 
minerals and deposits in South Africa.54 But one specific duty that made him very suitable for 
the tasks ahead was that he had served on the committee chaired by Sir Frederick Brundrett in 
1963, which, along with the Trend report on the re-organization of government science, had 
recommended the formation of the IGS under the new research councils in 1965. 
Unlike Guillaumat, Dunham was never involved in intelligence work. But serving in 
the Brundrett committee exposed him to the management style of one of Britain´s pioneers of 
scientific intelligence, which Brundrett had developed during the war in the Royal Naval 
Scientific Service. Partly thanks to these activities, Brundrett rose through the ranks 
becoming head of the Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and then science adviser to the 
Ministry of Defence.55 His connections with both scientific policy and the intelligence 
services were thus well established, and his influence had not waned with his retirement in 
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1959; since he was still responsible for the Defence Research Policy Committee; the chief 
planning organization of defense research in Britain.56
Brundrett’s policy review led to unify under the IGS geological work previously 
carried out separately by the Overseas Geological Survey and the geological survey unit of 
the Atomic Energy Division.57 It also more clearly directed IGS work towards oil security 
needs. Following a recommendation of fishery scientist Ray Beverton, assistant secretary of 
the newly established Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), Dunham agreed to the 
setting up of a up a Mineral Resources Consultative Committee (MRCC) under the aegis of 
the Department of Education and Science (DES). This enabled to share information (and 
concerns about data acquisition between various government agencies, including the DES, 
the Ministry of Power and the Ministry of Technology.58 The new committee now gave the 
IGS the mandate to looking at the geological and geophysical data available. 59
As Director of the IGS, Dunham was therefore made aware of the overall implications 
of controlling information on natural resources –oil especially- and not merely the geological 
details. He was willing but cautious in the face of the Ministry of Power’s demands: he did 
not have sufficient staff; they did not yet have the data they needed from the operators; and 
the time available would not be enough.60 The Ministry agreed to Dunham’s request for funds, 
but by mid-1968 Ministry officials began to be very concerned that the IGS would not have 
anything to work on as the information they needed would really begin to flow in early 
1969.61 
In essence the key problem for Dunham was that North Sea operators were being 
deliberately sluggish in sending their data, and there was little that either the Ministry or the 
IGS could do about that, especially as the physical well core samples were large unwieldy 
items requiring careful handling and storage. However, the Ministry needed at least some 
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information, and as quickly as possible. Most of the commercial operators were keen to co-
operate, at least in principle and up to a point, and the North Sea Operators’ Committee 
recommended to its members that they cooperate with any approaches for data from the 
IGS.62 On the one hand, they were legally obliged under the licenses to provide at least their 
raw data, and since the Ministry issued the licenses, they could not afford to appear 
uncooperative. On the other hand, some of the operators knew that the Ministry of Power, 
following the IGS advice, would use their data to further broader national interests rather than 
that of oil firms. At the time it was even suggested that a National Hydrocarbon Corporation 
should be established to address the problem; but the proposal was rejected.63 
Dunham however now skillfully used the power and knowledge that being part of the 
Brundrett committee had given him. Firstly, he sought to re-orient the existing geology 
programs so as to bring to the fore oil security matters. His predecessor at the Overseas 
Geological Survey had already outlined a geological survey of the British Continental Shelf. 
But now Dunham used NERC and Ministry of Power’s support to put forward an ambitious 
plan to prospect the North Sea basins and correlate geophysical and geological results with 
the goal of gaining greater knowledge of oil-bearing structures.64 
The purpose of his plan was exactly to counter the oil firm’s sluggish approach by 
making it possible for the IGS to collect its own data if necessary. And the IGS thus began to 
carry out its own surveys. Continental Shelf Unit I (CSU I) was established at the Leeds 
office to survey the central North Sea and the Irish Sea, along with the Mineral Assessment 
Unit (MAU) in London to analyze the findings. Continental Shelf Unit II (CSU II) was 
formed in Edinburgh to survey the northern North Sea. The MAU worked closely with the 
MRCC and was heavily involved in assessing North Sea resources, though it also had broader 
strategic concerns. In the North Sea, the first task was to establish the stratigraphy, so both 
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the immediate and the long-term program for the continental shelf work were quickly 
established, beginning with the “interpretation of data from commercial exploration of North 
Sea and Irish Sea,” and “offshore geophysical and geological investigations in the northern 
Irish Sea, Humber Estuary and North Sea off Lincolnshire.”65 The IGS received about half the 
data the operators then held by the end of 1967, and the flow continued in 1968. 
Meanwhile, Ministry officials attempted to speed the flow of data to the IGS by 
reassuring the operators on this score. Some therefore handed over even confidential 
interpretations of data to the Ministry and the IGS.66 This in fact later had the potential to 
cause problems between the Ministry and the operators. But they realized that the Minister 
might use their confidential data, or that independently collected by the IGS, to decide in 
favor of licenses issued to British Gas, though there was no nationalized oil interest. In this 
the Ministry was un-moveable, merely reiterating to the operators that its first concern was 
British national interests, which included British nationalized companies, though in practice it 
seems there was never any real conflict. Dunham has also to face the consequence of a White 
Paper that advocated a different allocation of funds to NERC and IGS thus putting in 
jeopardy both the Continental Shelf Survey and the IGS Mineral Intelligence program.67
So by the late 1960s Britain’s oil security appeared under threat mainly because, in 
contrast with other Western European allies, Britain could not count on a nationalized oil 
company or insufficient investments in geophysical research. In case of conflict or due to 
sudden lack of supply, it was unclear if these companies would protect national or 
commercial interests. The threat deriving from establishing an independent national survey 
unit –however- convinced private oil firms operating in the North Sea to be more 
collaborative thus aligning to the only imperative of the British government, i.e. secure a 
constant supply of oil to Britain.
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By 1971 a number of major fields had been discovered by oil companies in the North 
Sea, and the rate of commercial exploration and discovery was rapidly increasing. A 110-mile 
marine pipeline was being planned from the Forties field to the coast near Peterhead, and 
Dunham reported that “official statements suggest that by the end of the decade a substantial 
proportion of the United Kingdom’s oil requirements may be available from the North Sea,” 
adding that this was “the most important geology-based development in Britain since the 
opening up of the coal-fields.”68 The pressure began to tell on the IGS, however, in the 1970s, 
as basic survey work suffered while projects associated with the North Sea became 
paramount – not only analysis of the operators’ data, but also extended seabed surveys, 
pipeline projects, and growing transport links. So by 1975, when Dunham left office, he had 
effectively put in place a comprehensive plan of explorations prioritizing British oil security 
by aligning oil firms to IGS plans, since –as Dunham stressed- ‘the fossil fuels come first’.69 
Britain’s concerns with oil supply had greatly reduced (notwithstanding the oil crisis of 
1973). 
Conclusions
In both Cold War Britain and France oil supply was at the center of national security 
strategies during the Cold War, due to the critical role of oil in the military-industrial complex 
and ever-increasing domestic demand. Guided by similar fortunes, namely discovering 
sources of energy in their national territories and colonies that granted a certain degree of 
self-sufficiency, and finding their interests in the Middle East threatened by increasing Soviet 
and American influence, the French and British governments attempted to secure control of 
oil reserves in Algeria and the North Sea respectively. While the French had relatively little 
difficulty in achieving quasi-exclusivity over Algerian exploration, a territory over which 
France had complete political control, the British strategy was made more complicated by the 
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nature of the area of exploration, bordered by a number of independent European countries 
with their own energy and security concerns. 
In the late 1940s, French oil security was shattered both by ploys to evict CFP from 
the Middle East and by external political factors that France and CFP could not control. To 
rebuild their security, the French mobilized their army of exploration geophysicists and 
intelligence agents to know more about what could be found in the French Union and what 
other countries intended to do in these regions. They moved their focus to the French Union 
in an attempt to guarantee national supplies from an area they could use as their own private 
ground. The possession and management of confidential geological information shaped the 
beginning of Algeria’s oil era, and gave a marked advantage to French companies, which 
were able to use their practical monopoly rights for their exploration activities without having 
to worry too much about competitors. But foreign oil companies sought to establish their 
presence in the Sahara too, and take advantage of their influence internationally. The repeated 
requests of British and US oil firms to this end caused a long-lasting quarrel between French 
institutional sectors, resulting in the strictly government-moderated entrance of Shell into 
Algeria, in a joint-venture with French public agencies, or in making limited concessions to 
gain collaborative deals in oil exploration ventures elsewhere. The rest of Algeria, however, 
would be safely in French hands – at least for a few years. 
The British government, in contrast with the French, could count already on a fairly 
constant flow of oil from the Middle East. It maintained an interest in entering other areas 
outside Britain, but this waned somewhat when the North Sea was revealed to a rich source 
available of hydrocarbons. At this point the chief strategic urgency for the British Minister of 
Power became to administer North Sea licenses effectively, controlling the underlying 
knowledge that enabled private firms to extract the oil. Yet, geostrategic knowledge both in 
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the form of geological studies and an understanding of what other countries wished to do on 
their own territory was equally important. British security concerns stimulated both 
exploration and policy development within the Ministry of Power, speeding exploitation of 
the North Sea by encouraging both the operators and the IGS to map, survey and drill as 
much as possible as quickly as possible, to the extent that by the early 1970s the possibility of 
British near self-sufficiency was being mooted. In essence, the British government’s system 
of supply was based on control of licenses and thus on geophysical knowledge that would 
allow preventing access to other nations and a mechanism of distribution to companies 
permitting a regular flow of oil to the British mainland.
Oil exploration and geological knowledge had become another kind of intelligence for 
nations long accustomed to intelligence gathering, partially through the influence of officials 
such as Kinglsey Dunham and Guillaumat, who had backgrounds in the two sides of 
geostrategic intelligence: information on the underground resources, and the plans of those 
nations who had an interest in them.
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